

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

2004



2009

Committee on Foreign Affairs

2008/2197(INI)

16.10.2008

DRAFT REPORT

on the role of NATO in the security architecture of the EU
(2008/2197(INI))

Committee on Foreign Affairs

Rapporteur: Ari Vatanen

CONTENTS

	Page
MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION	3
EXPLANATORY STATEMENT.....	9

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

on the role of NATO in the security architecture of the EU (2008/2197(INI))

The European Parliament,

- having regard to the EU-NATO Joint Declaration of 16 December 2002,
 - having regard to the comprehensive framework for EU-NATO permanent relations, concluded by the EU Council Secretary-General/High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the NATO Secretary General on 17 March 2003,
 - having regard to the European Security Strategy (ESS) adopted by the European Council on 12 December 2003,
 - having regard to the Summit Declaration of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) issued in Bucharest on 3 April 2008,
 - having regard to the reports on the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) issued by the EU Council Presidency of 11 December 2007 and 16 June 2008,
 - having regard to its resolutions of 14 April 2005 on the ESS¹, of 16 November 2006 on the implementation of the ESS in the context of the ESDP², of 25 April 2007 on transatlantic relations³, of 5 June 2008 on the implementation of the European Security Strategy and ESDP⁴ and of 5 June 2008 on the forthcoming EU-US Summit⁵,
 - having regard to Rule 45 of its Rules of Procedure,
 - having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A6-0000/2008)
- A. whereas the EU and NATO are founded on shared values such as freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law, and throughout their existence have well served the cause of peace,
- B. whereas NATO is an intergovernmental organisation of democratic nations, in which civilians decide and the military executes,
- C. whereas 94 per cent of the EU population are NATO citizens, and 21 EU Member States out of 27 are NATO allies, and 21 NATO allies out of 26 are EU Member States,

¹ OJ C 33 E, 9.2.2006, p. 580.

² OJ C 314 E, 21.12.2006, p. 334.

³ OJ C 74 E, 20.3.2008, p. 670.

⁴ Texts adopted, P6_TA(2008)0255.

⁵ Texts adopted, P6_TA(2008)0256.

- D. whereas EU and NATO have built a partnership that is now well established and deep-rooted; whereas however, in order for this partnership to work, both organisations must ensure effective consultation, cooperation and transparency at all times,
- E. whereas NATO is the forum for discussion and the expected choice for a military operation involving the European and American Allies,
- F. whereas NATO as a whole is not engaged in ESDP operations; whereas the EU, in undertaking such an operation, will choose whether or not to have recourse to NATO assets and capabilities, through the so-called "Berlin plus arrangements",
- G. whereas EU and NATO cooperation that falls under the framework of the "Berlin plus arrangement" has been working satisfactorily up until now, as demonstrated in the case of Bosnia, from NATO SFOR to EUFOR Althea,
- H. whereas outside the "Berlin plus arrangements", NATO and the EU should ensure efficient crisis management and should work better together in order to identify the best possible response to a crisis, such as in Afghanistan and in Kosovo,
- I. whereas EU-NATO relations could be further improved by both organisations, with the EU involving the European non-EU NATO Allies further in ESDP and NATO involving the non-NATO EU Member States further in EU-NATO talks; whereas EU-US relations should be strengthened in order to further consolidate the existence of democratic freedoms,
- J. whereas NATO and the EU enlargement process should be mutually reinforcing and coordinated in order to secure stability and prosperity in the European continent,
- K. whereas an important element of the EU-NATO relationship is support for national efforts to develop and deliver military capabilities for crisis management in a mutually reinforcing way, which for its part enhances the primary task of safeguarding the territorial defence and security interests of member countries,
- L. whereas synergy between the EU and NATO in certain military capabilities areas could be improved through joint pilot projects,
- M. whereas our collective defence is based on a combination of conventional and nuclear forces adapted over the years to correspond to a rapidly changing environment; whereas the ultimate guarantor of military security for the Allies is the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance,

Strategical overview

1. Underlines that the *raison d'être* of the European Union is to build peace; notes that an ineffective security strategy or security policy leads to unnecessary human suffering;
2. Therefore calls on the EU to extend the missions of the European Security and Defence Policy so as to prevent conflicts, promote stability and bring relief to where it is needed, subject to a common consensus between EU Member States;

3. Recognises that the diversity of interests inherent in a Union of 27 or more Member States – in other words, the mosaic-like composition of the EU – gives it a unique character and the potential to intervene, mediate and help in different parts of the world, unlike any other major power; hopes that the existing military capability of the EU will develop into a credible force enabling the Union to exploit its unique abilities in the fields of conflict prevention and conflict resolution and complementing its broad range of civilian crisis management mechanisms;
4. Is convinced that the prospect of Euro-Atlantic integration of democracies is the best guarantor of security and stability across Europe and of respect of the principles of democracy, human rights, the rule of law and good governance;
5. Despite the current signals of a return to juxtaposition in EU-Russia-US relations, emphasises its view that such a development is not desirable; is convinced that democratic freedoms are the answer to aspirations for people around the world; believes that no country or nation should be excluded from such a vision, because every human being has the right to live in a democracy;
6. Welcomes the updating of the ESS as part of the European Union's commitment to defining and protecting European security interests and thus making it possible to create a strategy for tackling the threats of the 21st century; notes that this strategy can only be fully implemented through a revived EU-NATO cooperation consensus, based on a common approach to security policies, as well as a renewed and common security consensus between the EU and the United States of America, reflecting the common values and goals of these two democracies;
7. Underlines that this is still more important in the light of recent events in the Caucasus, new developments in the approach to NATO in Europe, the change of leadership in the United States of America and the start of the work on reviewing the strategic concept of NATO;
8. Is of the view that both NATO and the ESDP should endorse as their long-term and common goal a commitment to building a safer world, for the inhabitants of their member states and in general, and should also actively prevent and react to mass atrocities and regional conflicts which continue to cause much human suffering;
9. Insists that all democracies should be united in their efforts to build stability and peace, and thus join with all intergovernmental organisations in promoting these goals; regrets profoundly that the doctrine of non-alignment, inherited from the Cold War era, undermines the alliance of democracies to the benefit of undemocratic and not yet truly democratic powers; regrets that, in the name of a doctrine of non-alignment, certain Member States opted out of the joint responsibility provided for by the solidarity clause contained in the Treaty of Lisbon;

The relationship between NATO and the security architecture of the EU

10. Recognises the fundamental role of NATO, in the past as well as today, in the security architecture of the Europe; notes that for the majority of EU Member States, which are also NATO allies, the Alliance remains the foundation of their collective defence;

therefore takes the view that the only meaningful way to organise the future collective defence of the EU is within the Alliance;

11. Emphasises the increasing importance of the ESDP which will help to improve the EU's ability to confront existing and emerging 21st-century security threats, particularly in joint civilian-military operations and crisis management measures ranging from intelligence-driven crisis prevention actions to security sector reform, reform of the police and judiciary and military action;
12. Is of the view that the EU and NATO could strengthen each other by avoiding competition and developing greater cooperation based on a combined spectrum of action, with each covering parts of the spectrum that the other cannot presently cover, which will also help make savings;
13. Notes that the Berlin plus arrangements, which have been useful up until now, need to be improved in order to allow the two organisations to effectively deliver relief in current crises which demand a multi-task civilian-military response; regards it as necessary, therefore, to further develop the existing relationship between NATO and the EU, making them ever more integrated, reducing duplication and creating permanent joint structures of cooperation, while respecting the independent nature of both organisations;

Cooperation between NATO and the EU in security and defence issues

14. Strongly welcomes the French initiative of a formal return to the military structures of NATO, and the efforts by the French Presidency within the EU Council to further bring the EU and NATO together as a response to the new security challenges; welcomes the efforts of the French Presidency aimed at the adoption of concrete initiatives for the pooling of EU and NATO defence capabilities; also welcomes the positive approach of the United States of America towards the consolidation of EU defence capabilities;
15. Urges the member states of both organisations to be more flexible, goal-oriented and pragmatic in the implementation of the EU-NATO partnership; therefore asks the member states of both organisations to empower the EU Council and the NAC to implement the partnership more effectively, especially through the ability to have technical arrangements when and where needed, given the need to deliver in circumstances where the EU and NATO operate side by side in different missions towards the same common purpose in the same theatre, as in Kosovo and Afghanistan;
16. Notes that EU citizens support missions aimed at alleviating human suffering in conflict zones; notes that citizens are insufficiently informed about EU and NATO missions and their purpose; therefore calls on the EU and NATO to better inform people of their missions;

EU Operational Headquarters

17. Proposes the establishment of an EU Operational Headquarters in the vicinity of the main EU institutions, under the authority of the Secretary-General of the Council/High Representative; is of the view that such a structure could function as the "reactive arm" of the future High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy envisaged by the

Lisbon Treaty, and that the future European External Action Service could function as his/her "prevention arm";

18. Underlines that the experience of EU operations demonstrates that the lack of a permanent planning and command capability for EU operations has become a capability shortfall limiting the effectiveness and credibility of EU operations; emphasises that the proposed EU Operational Headquarters provides the solution to this problem; recalls that, given the civilian-military focus of the EU, such a structure would not duplicate anything that exists elsewhere; further recalls that the NATO Headquarters is primarily intended for military planning whereas the EU possesses expertise in planning and conducting both civilian and joint civilian-military operations which no other global actor is currently able to conduct successfully;
19. Stresses that an EU Operational Headquarters would complement the current NATO command structures and should not in any case lead to the creation of an EU caucus inside the NAC which could further undermine NATO's transatlantic integrity; is of the view that development of the EU and NATO should not under any circumstances lead to any degree of disintegration in the Alliance and that an adequate level of international credibility must be maintained;

Capabilities and military spending

20. Is of the view that the mutual challenge for the EU and NATO is to make use of the same national pool of resources in terms of personnel and capabilities; calls on the Member States to empower the Council and the NAC to ensure that these limited resources are spent on the most appropriate capabilities for facing the difficult challenges of today, avoiding duplication of work and fostering coherence; is of the view that strategic airlift, a particular example of a relatively scarce and expensive operational asset, should represent an opportunity for co-operation between the EU and NATO;
21. Is of the view that, in addition to the need for more efficient use of military resources, the need for more investment in defence at Member State level is essential in order to support the efforts to build effective EU-NATO cooperation and action; notes that the United States called on European NATO members during the NATO Bucharest Summit to increase their defence investments so as to support both NATO and EU operations; notes also the significant difference in numbers, as well as in effectiveness of defence spending, between European members of NATO and the U.S.; calls on the EU to commit itself to fairer global burden-sharing;

Compatibility between NATO and EU Member States

22. Insists that all the EU Member States must be present at the joint EU-NATO meetings without discrimination, even though there might on some occasions be disputes between Member States over certain issues; stresses that unity in terms of values and security arrangements is a vital factor guaranteeing European peace, stability and prosperity;
23. Proposes that those NATO Allies that are candidate for EU accession should at this point at least be given the status of Associate Members of the European Defence Agency, and

that they should thereafter should be further, more thoroughly and more permanently involved in ESDP in the spirit of being likely future members;

24. Notes that it is essential that the problem of the compatibility between non-membership of the EU and membership of NATO, as well as non-membership of NATO and membership of the EU, be addressed and tackled so as not to harm the functioning of EU-NATO cooperation;
25. Notes that it is essential for the future of EU-NATO cooperation that member states having a different and sometimes divergent tradition as to their views of that relationship should find a common ground and adopt a common vision for the future;

Prospective memberships and future of the Alliance

26. Welcomes the fact that, at the NATO summit held in Bucharest, the Allies recognised the value that a stronger and more capable European defence brings, and that the Alliance reconfirmed its commitment to continue enlargement; regrets that at the same summit the Allies postponed the NATO Membership Action Plan for Georgia and Ukraine, when instead continued support should be given to the democratisation process of Ukraine in the spirit of the Orange Revolution; notes that for many European Neighbourhood Policy countries, and with a view to their democratic development, the open-door policy which stems from the very founding principles of the EU is of the utmost importance;
27. Is of the view that, should Russia become a free and truly democratic country, an improved cooperation between it and all European, Euro-Atlantic and global structures would be very welcome and should be encouraged; does not exclude the prospect of Russia's membership of such structures one day; therefore invites Russia to return to the path of transforming itself into a true democracy, and to root out all practices of using violence as a means of furthering political goals; notes that, should the EU Member States agree to the bilateral security arrangements recently proposed by Russia, this would not only severely weaken the integrity of the security architecture of the EU but would also drive a wedge into the relationship between the EU and the U.S.;
28. Is of the view that NATO's forthcoming 60th anniversary Summit in Strasbourg and Kehl would offer an excellent opportunity to organise the first ever EU-NATO Summit to be held with a view to revising the nature of the partnership and strengthening its cooperation;

o

o o

29. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Parliaments of the Member States, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly and the Secretaries-General of the United Nations, NATO, the OSCE and the Council of Europe.

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

"...Indifference ... benefits the aggressor – never his victim,
whose pain is magnified when he or she feels forgotten.
The political prisoner in his cell, the hungry children,
the homeless refugees – not to respond to their plight,
not to relieve their solitude by offering them a spark of hope
is to exile them from human memory.
And in denying their humanity we betray our own."

Elie Wiesel, Holocaust survivor.

The day before the Nazi occupied Sudeten Land 70 years ago, Prime Minister Chamberlain came back to the United Kingdom after having met Hitler and was waving the Munich Agreement: 'I believe it's peace for our time'. Wishful thinking can be deadly.

When thinking about crucial questions about our security, and especially when drafting guidelines for them, we should be visionaries and independent enough to break free from vested interests.

At the eve of the twenty first century, the world faces many security challenges, old and new, who threaten the lives of many people and cause much human suffering. The European Union has a unique potential and duty to contribute to world stability. In the last decade, through the development of the ESDP, the EU has acquired a substantial array of civilian and military tools to fulfil this aim and has now started to conduct missions in many different parts of the world.

While the EU has demonstrated to be a global player through the development of ESDP missions, these are largely civilian in nature, concentrating on conflict prevention and post-conflict management. This is why EU-NATO cooperation and synergy are essential to pursue the common goal of promoting peace and stability in the international area. It is worth reminding that 94 percent of the EU population being a member of NATO and that a majority of EU member-states being members of NATO, the Alliance remains the principal framework for collective defence in Europe.

There is thus necessarily much room for complementarity in the relationship between the EU and NATO. A complementarity which is, however, often undermined by both technical and political obstacles. The aim of this report is thus to propose forward looking solutions for a revived EU-NATO relationship that would be able to effectively tackle current security challenges.

The first problem to be addressed is the limitations of the EU in terms of setting up a crisis management mission. Currently, the EU is lacking a permanent planning and command structure (OHQ). There are three options for the EU to choose an operational headquarters for its crisis management missions. The first is to choose amongst the five national headquarters

made available for the EU which implies considerable delay and losses in efficiency in the EU's ability to react to an emergency situation. The second is to use SHAPE under the Berlin plus arrangements, which implies an EU-NATO negotiation and the organization of an ad hoc chain of command (in the case of operation Althea, EU-NATO negotiations took over 8 months). This option thus makes rapid reaction impossible. Finally the third is to use the EU Operational Centre in Brussels but only on the condition that the two others are not available for the operation. The EU Operational Centre is not a permanent structure. It can be activated within 5 days achieving full capability within 20 days for operations up to 2000 soldiers. The problem is that the process of activating the Operational Centre requires the work of the EUMS which is therefore unavailable for important staff work such as crisis response strategic planning, military strategic contingency planning etc. These shortcomings seriously affect and limit the effectiveness and the credibility of EU operations.

In order to remedy to the present limitations provided by the different options that the EU has at its disposal to respond to a crisis situation in terms of operational command, this report suggests the creation of an EU operation headquarters. In view of maximising the effectiveness and coordination, this headquarter should be based in Brussels, under the authority of the Secretary General of the Council/High Representative of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. This will allow for effective translation and communication of military implications of political options and decisions to political leaders. But it should be stressed that, whereas the NATO Headquarters are primarily for military planning, the focus of the EU lies mainly in the civilian and joint civilian-military operations. The EU is the only global actor able to conduct successful operations in this domain.

Secondly, the inefficient use of military capabilities is something that affects the functioning of both the ESDP operations and NATO. The 27 member-states collectively spend EUR 200 billion on defence but despite such military resources, Europeans do not have nearly enough soldiers with the necessary skills. The member-states have close to 2 million personnel in their armed forces, but the EU can barely deploy and sustain 60,000 soldiers around the globe. It is therefore essential and indeed a precondition that for effective EU-NATO cooperation, member-states make a better use of their military assets. It is also a sad fact that European NATO members do not bear fair share of the burden, neither in terms of expenditure nor human resources. The report calls for a change to this: the U.S. should not be the paying partner of the Alliance.

Thirdly, certain disputes between NATO and EU members, such as the one related to the participation of Cyprus in EU-NATO meetings and the cooperation of Turkey in EU-NATO operations, have constituted major obstacles to an effective cooperation between the Alliance and the EU. The compatibility between the two organisations would benefit from a common commitment to have all EU member-states present at EU-NATO joint meetings. As important is that NATO Allies that are candidate for EU accession should be given at least the status of Associate Members of the European Defence Agency. They should also be incorporated more profoundly into ESDP structures. Only by eradicating the tensions between NATO and EU member-states will it be possible to achieve effective cooperation between the EU and NATO.

Finally, it is impossible to ignore the role of Russia when considering the future of EU-NATO relations. The recent crisis in Georgia unfortunately revealed Russia's readiness to pursue an

aggressive and destabilizing foreign policy. In the light of these events and of Russia's proposal for a new "security pact", the EU should make it clear that whilst it is highly desirable that the dialogue with Russia over Europe's security remains open, it will not accept any plan that attempts, in order to pursue unilateral security interests, to bypass or question the existing security architecture of Europe, based on the protection of democratic freedoms by the transatlantic alliance.

End Note

Some of the ideas of this report may not be implemented in the near future but we should try to see beyond the next elections as to where we are going. It would be self-deceiving to believe that human nature has changed for the better over the last thousands of years. Man still wants to exercise power over his neighbour both on an individual and collective level, often with disastrous results for the common good. Only fully fledged democracies can attempt to contain this human tendency and channel our selfish efforts to serve the common good. Even the most advanced democracies fall far short of an ideal society but the only remedy for the shortcomings of our democracies is to have more democracy!

The EU is an unprecedented success in the history of mankind in which people try to see in the '*foreigner*' another unique human being, a partner instead of a competitor. We are slowly forming a worldwide human team, "*une terre sans frontières*". The EU needs to move on because the world around us changes faster than we politicians are able to react to it. Our slowness results into unnecessary human suffering but we only grasp the pain when it touches us personally. We need to hear distant cries and react. It is our moral duty and in our long term interest. Wouldn't we want someone to come to our rescue when we are crying? We should be brutally honest and learn from our painful history. The EU, thanks to its mosaic nature, does not divide the world in half as the other great powers, and this gives the EU a unique opportunity for peace building. To accomplish this mission, the skills of a referee and a medical doctor are vital, but without a military dimension the EU is like a barking dog without teeth.

If we follow the logic of alleviating human suffering, mankind should one day have a binding code of conduct which would be enforced by a world army. We do not want more Rwandas! A kind of transformed '*blue helmet*' force, under the auspice of a totally overhauled UN. This would be the only force to have nuclear weapons at its disposal. At the end of World War II nobody could have predicted how far we, in Europe, would have progressed today. The same applies to the future. We should be confident in our capacity to overcome obstacles, the biggest of which is our short-sightedness. The only answer to global problems is global governance but a world army will not happen during my mandates...

The road ahead of us is very long, rough and will often be an uphill struggle, but that is secondary; the only thing that matters is that we are going in the right direction. We have to raise ourselves above daily political battles and draw inspiration from our forefathers. Whilst the war was raging in 1943, M. Jean Monnet made a radical, and at that time unrealistic, call for European Unity. He had the sincerely held conviction that, as Lamartine once said, "Utopia is nothing less than a premature truth". If we are to be leaders, we have to continue in that spirit.